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Abstract
Internet of Things (IoT) suffers from vulnerable sensor nodes, which are likely to endure
data falsification attacks following physical or cyber capture. Moreover, centralized decision-
making and data fusion schemes commonly used by these networks turn these decision points
into single points of failure, which are likely to be exploited by smart attackers. In order to
face this serious security thread, we propose a novel scheme that enables distributed data
aggregation and decision-making by following social learning principles. Our proposed scheme
makes sensor nodes to act resembling the manners of agents within a social network. We
analytically examine how local actions of individual agents can propagate through the whole
network, affecting the collective behaviour. Finally, we show how social learning can enable
network resilience against data falsification attacks, even when a significant portion of the
nodes have been compromised by the adversary.
Index terms— Distributed decision-making, data fusion, sensor networks, social networks,
data falsification attacks, Byzantine nodes, collective behaviour, social learning, information
cascades.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Internet of Things (IoT) is expected to play a central role in digital society. However, before
adopting this technology it is crucial to guarantee its security, specially for those public utili-
ties whose safety is crucial for the well-being of society [1]. Recent cyber-attacks that created
significant damage have been widely reported, e.g., the self-propagating malware WannaCry
that caused a famous worldwide network hack in May 2017 [2]. Therefore, developing tech-
nologies for guaranteeing the safety of large information networks such as IoT is a challenging
but urgent need. As information networks get more closely intertwined with our daily lifes,
ensuring their safety in the future will become an even more challenging issue.
As the level of security is determined by the weakest element, a major dilemma of IoT
security lies in the low-complexity sensor networks that are located at the edge of the system.
These sensor networks are usually composed by a large number of autonomous electronic
devices, which collect information that is critical to the control and operation of IoT [3, 4].
By monitoring extensive geographical areas, these networks enable a wide range of services to
civil society, being a key element for the well-being of smart cities [5, 6].These networks may
also perform sensitive tasks, including the surveillance over military or secure zones, intrusion
detection to private property, monitoring of drinkable water tanks and protection from chemical
attacks [7, 8].
Although the design of secure wireless sensor networks have been widely studied (e.g. [9–11]
and references therein), there remain open problems of both theoretical and engineering na-
ture [12]. In particular, as the number of sensors is usually very large, a precise management
of them is therefore challenging, or even unfeasible. A significant portion of the sensors might
be deployed in unprotected areas where it is impossible to ensure their physical or cyber se-
curity (e.g., war zones, or regions controlled by an adversary). Furthermore, sensor nodes are
generally not tamper-proof due to cost restrictions, and have hence limited computing and net-
working capabilities. Therefore, they may not be capable of employing reliable cryptographic
or security functions of high complexity.
The vulnerability of sensor nodes makes it reasonable to expect that they might be victims
of cyber/physical attacks driven by intelligent adversaries. Attacks to information networks
are usually categorized into outside attacks and insider attacks. Outside attacks include
(distributed) denial of services (DoS), which use the broadcasting nature for wireless com-
munications to disrupt the communications capabilities [10]. In contrast, in insider attacks
the adversary “recruits” sensor nodes by malware through cyber/wireless means, or directly
by physical substitution [13]. Following the classic Byzantine Generals Problem [14], these
“Byzantine nodes” are authenticated, and recognized as valid members of the network. Byzan-
tine nodes can hence generate false data, exhibit arbitrary behaviour, and collude with others
to create network malfunctions. In general, inside attacks are considered to be more dangerous
to information networks than outside attacks.
The effect of Byzantine nodes and data falsification over distributed sensor networks has
been intensely studied; the impact over the network performance has been characterized, and
various defense mechanisms has been proposed (c.f. [15] for an overview, and also [16–20]
for some recent contributions). However, all these works focus on networks with star or tree
topology, and rely on centralising the decision-making in special nodes, called “fusion centers”
(FCs), which gather all the sensed data. Therefore, a key element in these approaches is
a strong division of labour: ordinary sensor nodes merely sense and forward data, while the
processing is done exclusively at the FC, corresponding to a distributed-sensing/centralized-
processing approach. This literature implicitly assume that the FCs are capable of executing
secure coding and protocols, and hence are out of the reach of attackers. However, large infor-
mation networks might require another kind of mediator devices, known as data aggregators
(DAs), which have the capability to access the cloud through high-bandwidth communication
links [21]. DAs are attractive targets to insider attacks, as they might also be located in
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unsafe locations due to the limited range of sensor nodes’ radios. Please note that a tampered
DA can completely disable the sensing capabilities of all the nodes whose information has
been aggregated, generating a single point of failure that is likely to be exploited by smart
adversaries [22].
An attractive route to address this issue is to consider distributed-sensing/distributed-
processing schemes, which avoid centralized decision making while distributing processing
tasks throughout the network [23]. However, the design of practical distributed-sensing /
distributed-processing schemes is a challenging task, as collective computation phenomena
usually exhibit highly non-trivial features [24,25]. In effect, even though the distributed sensing
literature is vast (for classic references c.f. [26–28], and more modern surveys see [3,4,29,30]),
the construction of optimal distributed schemes is in general NP-hard [31]. Moreover, although
in many scenarios the optimal schemes can be characterized as a set of thresholds for likelihood
functions, the determination of these thresholds is usually an intractable problem [26]. For
example, homogeneous thresholds can be suboptimal even for networks with similar sensors
arranged in star topology [32], being only asymptotically optimal in the network size [33].
Moreover, symmetric strategies are not suitable for more complicated network topologies,
requiring heuristic methods.
1.2 Distributed decision-making in social learning
In parallel, significant research efforts have been dedicated to analyzing social learning, which
refers to the decision-making processes that take place within social networks [34]. In these
scenarios, agents make decisions based on two elements: private information that represents
agent’s personal knowledge, and social information derived from previous decisions made by
the agent’s peers [35].
Social learning was initially investigated by pioneering works that studied sequential decision-
making of Bayesian agents over simple social network structures [36,37]. These models showed
how, thanks to social interactions, individuals with weak private signals can harvest informa-
tion from the decisions of other agents [38]. Interestingly, it was also found that aggregation
of rational decisions could generate suboptimal collective responses, degrading the “wisdom
of the crowds” into mere herd behaviour. After these initial findings, researchers have aimed
at developing a deeper understanding of information cascades extending the original models
by considering more general cost metrics [39–41], and by studying the effects of the network
topology on the aggregated behaviour [42–45]. Non-bayesian learning models have also been
explored, where agents use simple rule-of-thumb methods to exchange information [46–52].
Social learning plays a crucial role in many important social phenomena, e.g., in the adop-
tion or rejection of new technology, or in the formation of political opinions [34]. Social
learning models are particularly interesting for studying information cascades and herd dynam-
ics, which arises when the social information pushes all the subsequent agents to ignore their
own personal knowledge and adopt a homogeneous behaviour [37]. Moreover, there have been
a renewed interest in understanding information cascades in the context of e-commerce and
digital society [45]. For example, information cascades might have tremendous consequences
in online stores where customers can see the opinions of previous customers before deciding to
buy a product, or in the emergence of viral media contents based on sequential actions of like
or dislike. Therefore, developing a deep understanding of the mechanics behind information
cascades are triggered, and how they impact social learning, is fundamental for our modern
networked society.
The main motivation behind this article is to explore the connections that exist between
social learning and secure sensor networks, building a bridge between the research done sepa-
rately by economists and sociologist by one side and electrical engineers and computer scien-
tists by other. A key insight for establishing this link is to realize that each agent’s decision
correspond to a compressed description of his/her private information. Therefore, the fact
that agents cannot access the private information of others, but can only observe their de-
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cisions, can be understood as a constraint in the communication resources. In this way,
social learning can be regarded as an information network that performs distributed inference
(see Table 1). Moreover, it would be natural to use social learning principles in the design
of distributed-sensing/distributed-processing schemes, with the hope that this might enables
additional robustness to decision-making processes in sensor networks.
Table 1: Table of correspondances
Distributed detection Social learning
Sensor node Social agent
Communication range Social neighbourhood
Environmental variables State of the world
Noisy measurement Private information
Local processing Agent’s decision
Bandwidth constraints Decision sharing
1.3 Contribution
In contrast to almost all the existing research, this work considers powerful topology-aware
data falsification attacks, where the adversary knows the network topology and leverages this
knowledge to take control of the most critical nodes of the network —either regular nodes, DAs
or FCs. This represents a worst-case scenario where the network structure has been disclosed,
e.g. through network tomography via traffic analysis [53]. The reason why this adversary
model has not been popular in the literature might be because traditional distributed sensing
schemes do not offer any resistance against this kind of attack.
In this work we explore the use of a distributed-sensing/distributed-processing scheme
based on social learning principles in order to deal with a topology-aware adversary. The
scheme is a threshold-based data fusion strategy, related to those considered in [26]. However,
its relationship with social decision-making allows an intuitive understanding of its mechanisms.
For avoiding security threads introduced by fusion centers, our scheme uses tandem or serial
decision sequencing [27,54–57]. It is to be noted that, contrasting with some related literature,
our analysis does not focus on optimality aspects of data fusion, but aims to illustrate how
distributed decision making can enable network resilience against powerful topology-aware
data falsification attacks. We demonstrate how network resilience hold even when a significant
number of nodes have been compromised.
Our work exploits a positive effect of information cascades that has been overlooked before:
information cascades make a large number of agents/nodes to hold equally qualified estimators,
generating many locations where a network operator can collect aggregated data. Therefore,
information cascades are crucial in our solution for avoiding single points of failure. For
enabling a better understanding of information cascades, this work extends results presented in
[58] providing a mathematical characterization of information cascades under data falsification
attacks. In particular, our results clarify the conditions upon which local actions of individual
agents can propagate across the network, compromising the collective performance. These
results provides a first step in the clarification of these non-trivial social dynamics, enriching
our understanding of decision-making process in biased social networks.
This paper expands the ideas presented in [59] by developing a formalism that allows
considering incomplete or imperfect social information. This formalism is used to overcome
the strongest limitation of the scheme presented in [59], namely the fact that each node was
required to overhear and store all the previous transmissions in the network. Clearly this cannot
take place in a large sensor network, due both to the storage constraints of the nodes, and to
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the large energy consumption required to transmit and receive across all pairs of nodes [60].
Therefore, the present work is an important step towards making this scheme more relevant
for practical applications.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the system model,
describing the network controller and the adversary behaviour. Our social learning data fusion
scheme is then described in Section 3, where some basic statistical properties are explored
and practical algorithm for implementing the decision rule is derived. Section 4 analyses the
mathematical properties of the decision process, providing a geometrical description and a
characterization of information cascades. All these ideas are then illustrated in a concrete
scenario in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our main conclusions.
2 System model and problem statement
This section introduces the basic elements of our framework and settles the basis for our social
learning scheme, which is then introduced in Section 3. In the rest of the paper uppercase let-
tersX are used to denote random variables and lowercase x realizations of them, while boldface
letters X and x represent vectors. Also, Pw {X = x|Y = y} = P {X = x|Y = y,W = w} is
used as a shorthand notation.
2.1 System model
We consider a network of N nodes, each corresponding to an information-processing device
that has been deployed in an area of interest. Each node is equipped with a sensor that enables
the network to track variables of interest. The measurement of the sensor of the n-th node is
denoted by Sn, taking values over a set S ⊂ R that can be discrete or continuous
1 . Based
on these signals, the network needs to infer the value of an underlying binary variable W .
We consider networks where all the nodes have equal sensing capabilities, that is, the
signals Sn are assumed to be identically distributed. Unfortunately, the general distributed
detection problem for arbitrarily correlated signals is known to be NP-hard [31]. Hence, for the
sake of tractability, it is assumed that the variables S1, . . . , SN are conditionally independent
given the event {W = w}2, following a probability distribution denoted by µw. It is also
assumed that both µ0 and µ1 are absolutely continuous with respect to each other [67],
i.e., no particular signal determines W unequivocally. This property, in turn, guarantees that
the log-likelihood ratio of these two distributions is always well-defined, being given by the
logarithm of the corresponding Radon-Nikodym derivative3 ΛS(s) = log
dµ1
dµ0
(s).
In addition to sensing hardware, each node is equipped with limited computing capability
and a wireless radio to transit and receive data. Two nodes in the network are assumed to
be connected if they can exchange information wirelessly. Note that sensor nodes usually
have a very limited battery budget, which impose severe restrictions on their communication
capabilities [68]. Therefore, it is assumed that each node forwards its data to others only by
broadcasting a binary variable Xn. These simple signals do not impose an additional burden on
the communication resources, as they could be appended to existent wireless control packages
and viceversa, or could be shared by light, ultrasound or other alternative media.
We focus on the case in which the sensing capabilities of each sensor are limited; and
hence, any inference about W made based only on the sensed data Sn cannot achieve a high
accuracy. Interestingly, due to the nature of wireless broadcasting, nearby transmissions can be
1The generalization of our framework and results to vector-valued sensor outputs is straightforward.
2The conditional independence of sensor signals is satisfied when the sensor noise is due to local causes (e.g.
thermal noise), but do not hold when there exist common noise sources (e.g. in the case of distributed acoustic
sensors [61]). For works that consider sensor interdependence see [62–66].
3When Sn takes a finite number of values then
dµ1
dµ0
(s) = P{Sn=s|W=1}
P{Sn=s|W=0}
, while if Sn is a continuous random
variable with conditional p.d.f. p(Sn|W = w) then
dµ1
dµ0
(s) = p(s|W=1)
p(s|W=0) .
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overheard, and therefore the information that they carry can be fused with what is extracted
from the local sensor. The information that a node can extract from overhearing transmissions
of other nodes is called “social information”, contrasting with the “sensorial information” that
is obtained from the sensed signal Sn.
Without loss of generality, nodes transmit their signals sequentially according to their
indices (i.e., node 1 transmits first, then node 2, etc.). It is assumed that this sequence is
randomly chosen, and can be changed by the network operator at any time (c.f. Section 2.2).
In general the broadcasted signals X1, . . . ,Xn−1 might not be directly observable by the n-th
agent because of various observational restrictions. Therefore, the social observations obtained
by the n-th node are represented by Gn ∈ Gn, which can be a random scalar, vector, matrix
or other mathematical object. Some cases of interest are:
(i) The k previous decisions: Gn = (Xn−k+1, . . . ,Xn−1).
(ii) The average value of the the previous decisions: Gn =
1
n−1
∑n−1
k=1 Xk.
(iii) The decisions of agents connected by an Erdos-Renyi stochastic network with parameter
ξ ∈ [0, 1], i.e. Gn = (Z1, . . . , Zn−1) ∈ {0, 1, e}
n−1, where
Zk =
{
Xk with probability ξ,
e with probability 1− ξ.
(1)
Please note that in the last example the Erdos-Renyi model has only been used as an illustrative
example, and it can be easily generalized to consider the topology of any stochastic network
of interest.
In this work we study the social dynamics based on the properties of the transition proba-
bility from states g′ ∈ Gn−1 to g ∈ Gn, as given by the conditional probabilities
βnw(g|xn,g
′) := Pw
{
Gn = g|Xn−1 = xn−1,Gn−1 = g
′
}
, (2)
where xn ∈ {0, 1}. We also assume that the social dynamics is causal, meaning that Gn is
conditionally independent of Sm given W for all m ≥ n.
2.2 The network operator and the adversary
The network is managed by a network operator, who is an external agent that uses the network
as a tool to build an estimate of W . The network operator is opposed by an adversary, whose
goal is to disrupt the inference capabilities of the network. For this aim, the adversary controls a
group of authenticated Byzantine nodes without being noticed by the network operator, which
have been captured by malware through cyber/wireless means, or by physical substitution.
The overall performance of a network of N nodes is defined by the accuracy of the inference
of the N -th node, which is the last one in the decision sequence. As the decision sequence
is generated randomly by the network operator, every node of the network is equally likely
to be at the end of the decision sequence. It is further assumed that the adversary has no
knowledge of the decision sequence, as it can be chosen at run-time and changed regularly.
As the adversary has no reason for capturing any particular node in the network, it is hence
reasonable to assume that the adversary captures nodes randomly. Therefore, the Byzantine
nodes are considered to be uniformly distributed over the network.
For simplicity, we model the strength of the attack with a single parameter pb, which
corresponds to the probability of a node of being compromised4. Moreover, we assume that
the capture probability does not depend on W 5. Hence, the number of Byzantine nodes,
denoted by N∗, is a Binomial random variable with E {N∗} = pbN . Due to the law of large
4This attack model assumes implicitly that the capture of each node is an independent event. Extensions
considering cyber-infection propagation properties are possible (c.f. [69]), being left for future studies.
5If the capture ratio would be higher when W = 1, then detecting Byzantine nodes would provide additional
evidence to detect attacks. As this would go against the adversary’s interest, we discard this possibility.
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numbers, N∗ ≈ pbN for large networks; and hence, pb is also the ratio of expected Byzantine
nodes in the network, which is the traditional metric for attack strength used in the literature.
For enabling the data processing and forwarding, the network operator defines a strategy,
i.e. a data fusion scheme given by a collection of (possibly stochastic) functions {pin}
∞
n=1
such that pin : S × Gn → {0, 1} for all n ∈ N. On the other hand, the adversary can freely
set the values of the binary signals transmitted by Byzantine nodes. This is modeled by a
random function C : {0, 1} → {0, 1} that corrupts the node’s broadcasted signal. Therefore,
the broadcasted signal of the n-th node is given by
Xn =
{
C(pin(Sn,Gn)) with probability pb, and
pin(Sn,Gn) otherwise.
(3)
Furthermore, as broadcasted signals are binary, the corruption function C(·) can be charac-
terized by the conditional probabilities c0|0 and c0|1, where ci|j = P {C(pi) = i|pi = j}.
The rest of this work focuses on the case in which the network operator can deduce the
corruption function and can estimate the capture risk pb. The average network miss-detection
and false alarm rates for an attack of intensity pb are defined as
P {MD; pb} := P1 {piN (SN ,GN ) = 0} , and (4)
P {FA; pb} := P0 {piN (SN ,GN ) = 1} , (5)
respectively (note that pb implicitly affects the distribution of GN ). The case in which these
quantities are unknown can be addressed using the current framework with a min-max analysis,
which is left for future studies.
2.3 Problem statement
Our goal is to develop a resilient strategy, in order to provide a reliable estimation of W even
under a significant number of unidentified Byzantine nodes. Note that in most surveillance
applications miss-detections are more important than false alarms, being difficult to estimate
the cost of the worst-case scenario. Therefore, the average network performance is evaluated
following the Neyman-Pearson criteria, by setting an allowable false alarm rate α and focusing
on reducing the miss-detection rate [70]. By denoting by P the set of all strategies, we look
to the following optimization problem:
minimize
{pin}∞n=1∈P
P {MD; pb}
subject to P {FP; pb} ≤ α.
(6)
However, finding an optimal solution is a formidable challenge, even for the simple case of
networks with start topology and no Byzantine attacks (see [30, 71] and references therein).
Therefore, our aim is to develop a sub-optimal strategy that enables resilience, while being
suitable for implementation in sensor nodes with limited computational power.
3 Social learning as a data aggregation scheme
This section describes our proposed data fusion scheme, and explains its functions against
topology-aware data falsification attacks. In the sequel, Section 3.1 describes and analyses
the data fusion rule, then Section 3.2 derives basic properties of it statistics, and finally
Section 3.3 presents a practical algorithm for its implementation.
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3.1 Data fusion rule
Let us assume that each sensor node is a rational agent, who tries to maximizes the profit of
an inference within a social network. Rational agents follow Bayesian strategies6, which can
be elegantly described by the following decision rule [70, Ch. 2]:
P {W = 1|Sn,Gn}
P {W = 0|Sn,Gn}
pin=0
≶
pin=1
u(0, 0) − u(1, 0)
u(1, 1) − u(0, 1)
. (7)
Above, u(x,w) is a cost assigned to the decision Xn = x when W = w, which can be
engineered in order to match the relevance of miss-detections and false alarms [70].
Let us find a simpler expression for the decision rule (7). Due to the causality constrain
(c.f. Section 2.1), Gn can only be influenced by S1, . . . , Sn−1, and therefore is conditionally
independent of Sn given W . Using this conditional independence condition, one can find that
P {W = 1|Sn,Gn}
P {W = 0|Sn,Gn}
= eΛS(Sn)+ΛGn(Gn), (8)
where ΛGn(Gn) is the log-likelihood ratio of Gn. Then, using (8) one can re-write (7) as
ΛS(Sn) + ΛGn(Gn)
pin=0
≶
pin=1
τ0 , (9)
where τ0 = log
P{W=0}
P{W=1} +log
u(0,0)−u(1,0)
u(1,1)−u(0,1) . In simple words, (10) states how the the n-th node
should fuse the private and social knowledge: the evidence is provided by the corresponding log-
likelihood terms, which are then simply added and then compared against a fixed threshold7.
Further understanding of the above decision rule can be attained by studying it from the
point of view of communication theory [58]. We first note that the decision is made not over
the full raw signal Sn but over the “decision signal” ΛS(Sn), which is a processed version
of it. Interestingly, this processing might serve for dimensionality reduction, as even though
Sn can be a matrix or a high-dimensional vector ΛS(Sn) is always a single number. Due to
their construction and the underlying assumptions over Sn (c.f. Section 2.1), the variables
ΛS(Sn) are identically distributed and conditionally independent given W = w. Moreover, by
introducing the shorthand notation τn(Gn) = τ0 − ΛGn(Gn), one can re-write (10) as
ΛS(Sn)
pin=0
≶
pin=1
τn(Gn) . (10)
Therefore, the decision is made by comparing the decision signal with a decision threshold τn.
Note that this represents a comparison between the sensed data, summarised by ΛS(Sn), and
the social information carried by τn(Gn).
3.2 Decision statistics
Let us find expressions for the probabilities of the actions of the n-th agent, first focusing on
the case n = 1. Note that
Pw {pi1(S1) = 0} = Pw {ΛS(S1) < τ0} = F
Λ
w (τ0) (11)
6Although Bayesian models are elegant and tractable, they assume agents act always rationally [72] and make
strong assumptions on the knowledge agents have about posterior probabilities [49]. However, Bayesian models
provide an important benchmark, not necessarily due to their accuracy but because they give an important
reference point with which other models can be compared [35].
7As the prior distribution of W is usually unknown, τ0 is a free parameter of the scheme. Following the
discussion in Section 2.3, the network operator shall select the lowest value of τ that satisfies the required false
alarm rate given by the Neyman-Pearson criteria.
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where FΛw (·) is the c.d.f. of ΛS conditioned on W = w. Then, considering the possibility that
the first node could be a Byzantine, one can show that
Pw {X1 = 0} = pbPw {X1 = 0| Byzantine}+ (1− pb)Pw {X1 = 0|not a Byzantine}
= pb(c0|0F
Λ
w (τ0) + c0|1[1− F
Λ
w (τ0)]) + (1− pb)F
Λ
w (τ0) (12)
= z0 + z1F
Λ
w (τ0) , (13)
where we are introducing z0 := pbc0|1 and z1 := 1−pb(1− c0|0+ c0|1) as short-hand notation,
which are non-negative constants that summarize the strength of the adversary. In particular,
when the adversary is powerless then z0 = 0 and z1 = 1 and hence Pw {pi1(S1) = 0} =
Pw {X1 = 0}.
By considering the n-th node, one can find that
Pw {pin(Sn,Gn) = 0|Gn = gn} =
∫
S
Pw {pin(sn,gn) = 0|Sn = s}µw(s)ds
=
∫
S
1 {pin(gn, s) = 0}µw(s)ds (14)
= Pw {ΛS(s) < τn(gn)} (15)
= FΛw (τn(gn)) . (16)
The first equality is a consequence of the fact that Sn is conditionally independent of Gn
given W = w, while the second equality is a consequence that Xn can be expressed as a
deterministic function of Gn and Sn, and hence becomes conditionally independent of W .
Note that (16) shows that τn is a sufficient statistic for predicting Xn with respect to Gn.
Note that FΛw (x) can be directly computed from the statistics of the signal distribution (its
properties are explored in Appendix A). Moreover, using (16) and following a similar derivation
as in (12), one can conclude that
Pw {Xn = 0|Gn = gn} = z0 + z1F
Λ
w (τn(gn)). (17)
Let us now study the statistics of Gn. By using the definition of the transition coefficients
βnw(gn+1|xn,gn), one can find that
Pw
{
Gn+1 = gn+1
}
=
∑
gn∈Gn
∑
xn∈{0,1}
βnw(gn+1|xn,gn)Pw {Xn = xn,Gn = gn} . (18)
Note that, using the above derivations, the terms Pw {Xn = xn,Gn = gn} can be further
expressed as
Pw {Xn = xn,Gn = gn} = Pw {Xn = xn|Gn = gn}Pw {Gn = gn} (19)
= λ(z0 + z1F
Λ
w (τn(gn)), xn)Pw {Gn = gn} , (20)
where λ(p, x) = x(1 − p) + (1 − x)p. Therefore, a closed form expression can be found for
(18) recursively over Gn.
3.3 An algorithm for computing the social log-likelihood
The main challenge for implementing (10) as a data processing method in a sensor node is
to have an efficient algorithm for computing τn(gn). Leveraging the above derivations, we
develop Algorithm 1 as a iterative procedure for computing τn.
In many cases of interest the algorithm’s complexity scales gracefully. For the particular
case of nodes with memory of length k (i.e. Gn = (Xn−k−1, . . . ,Xn−1)), the algorithmic
complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(2kN), and therefore grows linearly with the size of the network,
while being limited in the values of k that can consider. In general, the algorithm complexity
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Algorithm 1 Computation of the decision threshold
1: function Compute Tau(N,FΛ0 (·), F
Λ
1 (·), β
n
w(·|·, ·), τ0, z0, z1)
2: τ1 = τ0
3: for x1 ∈ {0, 1} do
4: P0 {X1 = x1,G1 = 0} = λ(z0 + z1F
Λ
0 (τ1), x1)
5: P1 {X1 = x1,G1 = 0} = λ(z0 + z1F
Λ
1 (τ1), x1)
6: for n = 1, . . . , N − 1 do
7: for ∀g ∈ Gn+1 do
8: P0 {Gn+1 = g} =
∑
gn∈Gn
∑
xn={0,1}
βnw(gn+1|xn, gn)P0 {Xn = xn,Gn = gn}
9: P1 {Gn+1 = g} =
∑
gn∈Gn
∑
xn={0,1}
βnw(gn+1|xn, gn)P1 {Xn = xn,Gn = gn}
10: ΛGn(g) = log
P1{Gn=g}
P0{Gn=g}
11: τn(g) = ν + η − ΛGn(g)
12: for xn+1 ∈ {0, 1} do
13: P0 {Xn+1 = xn+1,Gn+1 = g} = λ(z0 + z1F
Λ
0 (τn(gn)), xn+1)P0 {Gn+1 = g}
14: P1 {Xn+1 = xn+1,Gn+1 = g} = λ(z0 + z1F
Λ
1 (τn(gn)), xn+1)P1 {Gn+1 = g}
15: return τN (·)
scales linearly with N as long as the cardinality of Gn are bounded, or if a significant portion
of the terms βnw(gn+1|xn,gn) are zero.
The inputs that drive Algorithm 1 can be classified in two groups. First, the terms
N,FΛ0 (·), F
Λ
1 (·), β
n
w(·|·, ·) are properties of the network (position of the node within the deci-
sion sequence, sensor statistics and social observability, respectively) that the network operator
could measure. On the other hand, τ0, z0, z1 are properties of the adversary profile that de-
pend on the prior statistics of W , pb and the corruption function defined by c0|0 and c0|1 (c.f.
Section 2.2). In most scenarios the knowledge of the network controller about these quantities
is limited, as attacks are rare and might follow unpredictable patters. Limited knowledge can
still be exploited using e.g. Bayesian estimation techniques [73]. If no knowledge is available
for the network controller, then these quantities can be considered free parameters of the
strategy that span a range of alternative balances between miss-detections and false positives,
i.e. a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) space.
4 Information cascade
The term “social learning” refers to the fact that pin(Sn,Gn) becomes a better predictor of W
as n grows, and hence larger networks tend to develop a more accurate inference. However,
as the number of shared signals grows, the corresponding “social pressure” can make nodes
to ignore their individual measurements to blindly follow the dominant choice, triggering a
cascade of homogeneous behaviour. It is our interest to clarify the role of the social pressure
in the decision making of the agents involved in a social network, as information cascades can
introduce severe limitations in the asymptotic performance of social learning [44].
Moreover, an adversary can leverage the information cascade phenomenon. In effect, if the
number of Byzantine nodes N∗ is large enough then a misleading information cascade can be
triggered almost surely, making the learning process to fail. However, if N∗ is not enough then
the network may undo the pool of wrong opinions and end up triggering a correct cascade.
In the sequel, the effect of information cascades is first studied in individual nodes in
Section 4.1. Then, the propagation properties of cascades is explored in Section 4.2.
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4.1 Local information cascades
In general, the decision pin(Sn,Gn) is made based in the evidence provided by both Sn and
Gn. A local cascade takes place in the n-th agent when the information conveyed by Sn is
ignored in the decision-making process due to a dominant influence of Gn. We use the term
“local” to emphasize that this event is related to the data fusion of an individual agent. This
idea is formalized in the following definition using the notion of conditional mutual information
[74], denoted as I(·; ·|·).
Definition 1. The social information gn ∈ Gn generates a local information cascade for
the n-th agent if I(pin;Sn|Gn = gn) = 0.
The above condition summarizes two possibilities: either pin is a deterministic function
of Gn and hence there is no variability in pin after Gn has been determined, or there is still
variability (i.e. pin is a stochastic strategy) but it is conditionally independent of Sn. In both
cases, the above formulation highlights the fact that the decision pin contains no information
coming from Sn
8.
Lemma 1. The variables Gn → τn → pin form a Markov Chain (i.e. τn is a sufficient
statistic of Gn for predicting the decision pin).
Proof. Using (16) one can find that
Pw {pin|τn,Gn} = λ(F
Λ
w (τn),Xn) = Pw {pin|τn} ,
and therefore the conditional independency of pin and Gn given τn is clear.
Let us now introduce the notation Us = ess sups∈S ΛS(Sn = s) and Ls = ess infs∈S ΛS(Sn =
s) for the essential supermum and infimum of ΛS(Sn), being the signals within S that most
strongly support the hypothesis {W = 1} over {W = 0} and viceversa9. If one of these
quantities diverge, this would imply that there are signals s ∈ S that provide overwhelming
evidence in favour of one of the competing hypotheses. If both are finite then the agents
are said to have bounded beliefs [44]. As sensory signals of electronic devices are ultimately
processed digitally, the number of different signals that an agent can obtain are finite and
hence their supremum is always finite. Therefore, in the sequel we asume that both Ls and
Us are finite. Using these notions, the following proposition provides a characterization for
local information cascades.
Proposition 1. The social information gn ∈ Gn triggers a local information cascade if
and only if the agents have bounded beliefs and τn(gn) /∈ [Ls, Us].
Proof. Let us assume that the agents have bounded beliefs. From the definition of FΛw ,
which is a cumulative density function, it is clear that if τn < Ls then F
Λ
0 (τn) = F
Λ
1 (τn) =
0, while if τn > Us then F
Λ
0 (τn) = F
Λ
1 (τn) = 1. Therefore, if τn(gn) /∈ [Ls, Us] then,
according to (16), it determines pin almost surely, making pin and Sn conditionally inde-
pendent.
To prove the converse by contrapositive, let us assume that Ls < τn(gn) < Us. Using
again (16) and the definition of Us and Ls, one can conclude that this implies that 0 <
Pw {pin = 0|Gn} < 1 for both w ∈ {0, 1}. This, in turn, implies that the sets S
0(τ) = {s ∈
S|ΛS(s) < τn(Gn} and S
1(τ) = S − S0 both have positive probability under µ0 and µ1,
which in turn implies the existence of conditional interdependency between pin and Sn in
this case.
8Recall that Sn and Gn are conditionally independent given W = w (c.f. Section 3.1), and hence there
cannot be redundant information about W that is conveyed by Sn and also Gn. For a more detailed discussion
about redundant information c.f. [75].
9The essential supremum is the smallest upper bound over ΛS(Sn) that holds almost surely, being the natural
measure-theoretic extension of the notion of supremum [76].
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Intutively, Proposition 1 shows that a local information cascade happens when the social
information goes above the most informative signal that could be sensed. Some consequences
of this result are explored in the next section.
4.2 Social information dynamics and global cascades
It is of great interest to predict when a local information cascade could propagate across the
network, disrupting the collective behaviour and hence affecting the network performance. The
following definition captures how, during a “global information cascade”, the shared signals
Xn do not convey anymore information from the corresponding sensor signals.
Definition 2. The social information gn ∈ Gn triggers a global information cascade if
I(Xm : Sm|Gn = gn) = 0 holds for all m ≥ n.
A global information cascade is a succession of local information cascades. As Proposition 1
showed that agents are free from local cascades as long as τn ∈ [Ls, Us], one can guess that
global cascades are related to the dynamics of τn. These dynamics are determined by the
transitions of Gn, which follows the behaviour dictated by the transition coefficients β
n
w(·|·, ·).
To further study the social information dynamics we introduce the following definitions.
Definition 3. The collection {Gn}
∞
n=1 is said to have:
1. strongly consistent transitions if, for anyW = w, g ∈ Gn and g
′ ∈ Gn−1, β
n
w(g|1,g
′) >
0 implies τn(g) ≤ τn−1(g
′), while if βnw(g|0,g
′) > 0 implies τn(g) ≥ τn−1(g
′).
2. weakly consistent transitions if, for all g ∈ Gn and g
′ ∈ Gn−1, τn−1(g
′) ≤ Ls
and Pw {Gn = g|Gn−1 = g
′} > 0 implies τn(g) ≤ Ls, while τn−1(g
′) ≥ Us and
Pw {Gn = g|Gn−1 = g
′} > 0 implies τn(g) ≥ Us
10.
Intuitively, strong consistency mean that the decision threshold evolves monotonically with
respect to the broadcasted signals Xn. Correspondingly, weak consistency implies that τn
cannot return into [LS , US ] after going beyond it. Moreover, the adjectives “strong” and
“weak” reflect the fact that weak consistency only takes place outside the boundaries of the
signal likelihood, while the strong consistency affects all the decision space. Moreover, strong
consistent transitions imply weak consisten transitions when there are no Byzantine nodes, as
shown in the next Lemma11.
Lemma 2. Strong consistent transitions satisfy the weak consistency condition if pb = 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
We show next that if the evolution of Gn becomes deterministic and 1-1 after leaving the
interval [Ls, Us] (henceforth called weakly invertible transitions), then it satisfies the weak
consistency condition.
Lemma 3. Weekly invertible transitions imply the weakly consistency condition.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Now we present the main result of this section, which is the characterization of information
cascades for the case of social information that follows weakly consistent transitions.
Theorem 1. If the social information have weakly consistent transitions, then a global
information cascade is triggered by each local information cascade.
10Note that the condition Pw {Gn = g|Gn−1 = g
′} > 0 is equivalent to ask either βnw(g, |0, g
′) or βnw(g, |1, g
′)
to be strictly positive.
11It is possible to build examples where weak consistency does not follow strong consistency when pb > 0.
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Proof. Let us consider g0 ∈ Gn such that it produce a local cascade in the n-th node. Then,
due to Proposition 1, this implies that τn(g) /∈ [Ls, Us] almost surely. This, combined with
the weakly consistency assumption, implies that τn+1(Gn+1) /∈ [Ls, Us] almost surely. A
second application of Proposition 1 make us to conclude that Pw {pi = 0|Gn+1} is therefore
equal to 0 o 1. This, in turn, guarantees that I(pin+1 : Sn+1|Gn = g) = 0) almost surely,
showing that the (n + 1)-th node experiences a local information cascade because of
Gn = g0.
Finally, it is direct to see that a recursive application of the above argument allows
one to prove that I(pin+m : Sn+m|Gn = g) = 0) for all m ≥ 0, confirming the existence of
a global cascade.
This theorem has a number of important consequences. Firstly, it provides an intuitive
geometrical description about the nature of global cascades for networks with weak consistency.
One can imagine the evolution of τn(Gn) as function of n as a random walk within the interval
[Ls, Us]. Because of the weakly consistency condition, if the random walk step out of the
interval, it will never come back. Moreover, as consequence of this theorem, the stepping out
of [Ls, Us] is a necessary and sufficient condition to trigger a global information cascade over
the network.
Also, note that in the case where Gn = X
n (i.e. each node see every previous decision)
is direct to prove that Gn has weakly invertible transitions. Therefore, Theorem 1 is a gen-
eralization of Theorem 1 of [58], now being valid for the case where there are a fraction of
Bizantine nodes within the network.
5 Proof of concept
This section illustrates the main results obtained in Sections 3 and 4 in a simple scenario. In
the sequel, first Section 5.1 describes the scenario, and then Section 5.2 discusses numerical
simulations.
5.1 Scenario description
Let us consider a sensor network that has surveillance duties over a sensitive geographical area.
The sensitive area could correspond to a factory, a drinkable water container or a warzone,
whose key variables need to be supervised. The task of the sensor network is, through the
observation of these variables, to detect the events {W = 1} and {W = 0} that correspond
to the presence or absence of an attack to the surveilled area, respectively. No knowledge
about of the prior distribution of W is assumed.
We consider nodes that have been deployed randomly over the sensitive area, and hence
their location follow a Poisson Point process (PPP). The ratio of the area of interest that
falls within the range of each sensor is denoted by r. If attacks occur uniformly over the
surveilled area, then r is also the probability of an attack taking place under the coverage
area of a particular sensor is. Note that, due to the limited sensing range, the miss-detection
rate of individual nodes is roughly equal to 1− r. As r is usually a small number (5% in our
simulations), this implies that without collaboration each node is extremely unreliable.
Each node measures its environment using a digital sensor ofm levels dynamical range (i.e.
Sn ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m−1}). Under the absence of an attack, the measured signal is assumed to be
normally distributed with a particular mean value and variance. For simplicity of the analysis,
we assume that Sn conditioned in {W = 0} distributes following a binomial distribution of
parameters (m, q), i.e.
P0 {Sn = sn} =
(
m
sn
)
qsn(1− q)m−sn := f(sn;m, q) (21)
which because of the central limit theorem approximates a Gaussian variable when m is
relatively large. Moreover, it is assumed that the sensor dynamical range is adapted to match
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Figure 1: Probability distribution for a digital sensor of m = 16 levels, conditioned on the
events {W = 0} and {W = 1}.
the mean value on the lower third of the sensor dynamical range, i.e. E {Sn|W = 0} = m/3.
This naturally imposes the requirement q = 1/3.
Following standard statistical approaches, it is further assumed that the sensors control
the environment looking for events where the measured data is significantly high, i.e. when
it is larger than mean value in more than two standard deviations. This corresponds e.g.
when a specific chemical compound trespasses safe concentration values or when too much
movement has been detected over a given time window (see e.g. [77]). Using the fact that
Var{Sn} = mq(1−q), this gives a threshold T = E {Sn}+2
√
Var{Sn} = np+2
√
nq(1− q).
Therefore, it is assumed that an attack is related to the event of Sn being uniformly distributed
in [T,m]. Therefore, one finds that
P1 {Sn = sn} =(1− r)P1 {Sn = sn|attack out of range}+ rP1 {Sn = sn|attack in range}
=(1− r)f(sn;m, q) + r
H(sn − T )
m− T
, (22)
where H(x) is the discrete Heaviside (step) function given by
H(x) =
{
1 if x ≥ 0
0 in other case.
(23)
In summary, Sn conditioned on {W = 1} is modeled as a mixture model between a Binomial
and a truncated uniform distribution, where the relative weight between them is determined
by r (c.f. Figure 1). Finally, using (21) and (21), the log-likelihood function of the signal Sn
can be determined as (see Figure 2)
ΛSn(sn) = log
P1 {Sn = sn}
P0 {Sn = sn}
= log
{
(1− r) +
rH(sn − T )
(m− T )f(sn;m, q)
}
. (24)
We focus on scenarios where a node can overhear the tranmissions of all the other nodes.
However, we consider the case where the listening period is restricted12. We therefore study
the case where the social information gathered by the n-th node isGn = (Xn−k−1, . . . ,Xn−1)
if n > k. Here k is a design parameter, whose impact in the network performance is studied
in the next section.
5.2 Discussion
We analysed the performance of networks of N = 300 sensor nodes whose sensors can monitor
r = 5% of the target area. Using the definition given in (4) and (5), combined with (16),
12It is well-known that the wireless radios of small sensor nodes consume a similar amount of energy while
transmitting or receiving data, and hence reducing overhearing periods is key for attaining energy efficiency and
hence long network lifetime [60].
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Figure 2: Log-likelihood of a digital signal of m = 16 levels with respect to the variable W .
miss-detection and false alarm rates were computed as
P {MD} =
∑
g∈Gn
FΛ1 (τn(g))P1 {Gn = g} and (25)
P {FA} =
∑
g∈Gn
(1− FΛ0 (τn(g)))P0 {Gn = g} , (26)
where the terms Pw {Gn = g} are computed using Algorithm 1 (c.f. Section 3.3. In order to
favour the reduction of miss-detections over false alarms, τ0 = 0 is chosen as is the lowest
value that still allows a non-trivial inference process13. We consider an upper bound over the
tolerable false alarm rate of 5%.
Simulations demonstrate that the proposed scheme enables strong network resilience in
this scenario, allowing the sensor network to maintain a low miss-detection rate even in the
presence of an important number of Byzantine nodes (see Figure 3). Please recall that if
a traditional distributed detection scheme based on centralised decision is used, a topology-
aware attacker can cause a miss-detection rate of 100% by just compromising the few nodes
that perform data aggregation (i.e. the FC(s)). Figure 3 shows that nodes that individually
would have a miss-detection rate of 95% can improve up to around 10% even when 30% of the
nodes are under the control of the attacker. Therefore, by making all the nodes to agregate
data, the network can overcome the influence of Bizantine nodes and hence even when some
nodes have been compromised the rest of the network can and generate a correct inference.
Please note that, for the case illustrated by Figure 3, when there are Byzantine nodes the
miss-detection rate improves until the network size reaches N = 500, achieving a performance
of ≈ 10−12 (not shown in the Figure). This result has two important implications. First, this
confirms the prediction of Theorem 1 that if the signal log-likelihood is bounded then informa-
tion cascades are eventually dominant, hence stoping the learning process of the network (for
a more detailed discussion about this issue please c.f. [58]). Secondly, this result stress a key
difference of our approach with respect to the existent literature about information cascades:
even if information cascades become dominant and hence perfect social learning cannot be
achieved by bounded signals, the achieved performance can still be very high and hence useful
in a practical information-processing setup.
The network resilience provided by our scheme is influenced by the sensor dynamical range,
m, as a higher sensor resolution is likely to provide more discriminative power. Our results
show three sharply distinct regimes (see Figure 4). First, if m is too small (m ≤ 4) the
network performance is very poor, irrespective of the number of Byzantine nodes. Secondly,
if 8 ≤ m ≤ 32 the miss-detection rate without Byzantine nodes is approx. 10% (cf. Figure 4)
and is exponentially degraded by the presence of Byzantine nodes. Finally, if m ≥ 64 then
the performance under no Byzantine nodes is very high, and is degraded super-exponentially
13Simulations showed that if τ < 0 then Xn = 1 for all n ∈ N independently of the value of W , triggering a
premature information cascade.
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Figure 3: Performance for the inference of each node for various attack intensities, given by the
average ratio of Byzantine nodes N∗/N = pb. Agents overhear the previous k = 4 broadcasted
signals, and use sensors with dynamical range of n = 64.
by the presence of Byzantine nodes. Interestingly, the point at which the miss-detection rate
of this regime goes above 10−1 is at N∗/N = 1/3, having some resemblance with the well-
known 1/3 threshold of the Byzantine generals problem [14]. Also, it is intriguing the fact that
differences between 8 and 32 levels in the dynamical range gives practically no performance
benefits.
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Figure 4: Effect of the sensor dynamical range over the network resilience.
Our results also show the effects of the memory size, k, showing that larger values of
k provides great benefits for the network resilience (see Figure 5). In effect, by performing
an optimal bayesian inference over 8 broadcasted signals the network miss-detection rate
remains bellow 10% up to an attack intensity of 50% of Byzantine nodes. Unfortunately,
the computation and storage requirements of Algorithm 1 grow exponentially with k, and
hence using memories beyond k = 10 is not practical for resource-limited sensor networks.
Overcoming this limitation is an relevant future line of investigation.
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Figure 5: A larger node memory, which allows to include more social signals into the inference
process, greatly improves the network resilience.
6 Conclusions
Traditional approaches to data aggregation over information networks are based on a strong
division of labour, which discriminates between sensing nodes that merely sense and forward
data, and fusion centers that monopolize all the processing and inference capabilities. This
generates a single point of failure, which is likely to be exploited by smart adversaries whose
interest is the disruption of the network capabilities.
This serious security thread can be overcome by distributing the decision making process
across the network using social learning principles. This approach avoids single points of
failure by generating a large number of nodes from where aggregated data can be accessed.
In this paper a social learning data fusion scheme has been proposed, which is suitable of
being implemented in devices with limited computational capabilities.
We showed that if the private signals are bounded then each local information cascades
triggers a global cascade, extending previous results to the case where an adversary controles
an number of Byzantine nodes. This result is highly relevant for sensor networks, as digital
sensors are intrinsically bounded and hence satisfy the assumptions of these results. However,
contrasting with the literature, our approach does not focus on the conditions that guarantee
perfect asymptotical social learning (i.e. miss-detection and false alarm rates converging to
zero), but if their limit is small enough for practical applications. Our results show that this
is the case, even when limiting the number of overheared transmissions.
Moreover, our results suggest that social learning principles can enable significant resilience
of an information network against topology-aware data falsification attacks, which can totally
disable the detection capabilities of traditional sensor networks. Furthermore, our results
illustrate how the network resilience can persists even when the attacker has compromised an
important number of nodes.
It is our hope that these results can motivate further explorations on the interface between
distributed decision making, statistical inference and signal processing over technological and
social networks.
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A Properties of FΛw
For simplicity let us consider the case of real-value signals, i.e. Sn ∈ R. In this case, the c.d.f.
of the signal likelihood is given by
FΛw (y) =
∫
Sy
dµw (27)
where Sy = {x ∈ R|Λs(x) ≤ y}. If Λs is an increasing function, then S
y = {x ∈ R|x ≤
Λ−1s (y)} = (−∞,Λ
−1
s (y)] and hence
FΛw (y) =
∫ Λ−1s (y)
−∞
dµw = Hw(Λ
−1
s (y)) , (28)
where Hw(s) is the cumulative density function (c.d.f.) of Sn for W = w. For the general
case where Λs is an arbitrary (piece-wise continuous) function, then S
y can be expressed as
the union of intervals. Then ∪∞j=1[aj(y), bj(y)] = S
y (note that Λs(aj(y)) = Λs(bk(y)) = y)
and hence from (27) is clear that
FΛw (y) =
∞∑
j=1
∫ bj(y)
aj(y)
dµw =
∞∑
j=1
[Hw(bj(y))−Hw(aj(y))] . (29)
B Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Lets assume that the process Gn has strong consistent transitions and consider
g′ ∈ Gn−1 such that τn−1(g
′) ≤ Ls. Note that, under these conditions F
Λ
w (τn−1(g
′)) = 0,
and hence
Pw
{
Xn−1 = 1|Gn−1 = g
′
}
= 1− z0 − z1F
Λ
w (τn−1(g
′)) = 1− pbc0|1 = 0 (30)
holds for any w ∈ {0, 1}. Moreover, this allows to find that
Pw{Gn = g|Gn−1 = g
′} =
∑
xn∈{0,1}
βnw(g|xn,g
′)Pw
{
Xn−1 = xn|Gn−1 = g
′
}
= βnw(g|1,g
′) . (31)
Therefore, due to the strongly consistent transition property, if Pw {Gn = g|Gn−1 = g
′} =
βnw(g|1,g
′) > 0 then
Ls ≥ τn−1(g
′) ≥ τn(g) , (32)
proving the weak consistent transition property. The proof for the case of τn−1(g
′) ≥ Us
is analogous.
C Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Let us consider g0 ∈ Gn such that τn(g0) /∈ [Ls, Us]. Then, due to the weakly
invertible evolution, for each x ∈ {0, 1} there exists g(x) ∈ Gn+1 such that
βnw(g|x,g0) =
{
1 if g = g(x),
0 in other case.
(33)
Moreover, note that while the deterministic assumption implies that the event {Gn = g0}
could be followed by either {Gn+1 = g(0)} or {Gn+1 = g(1)}, the 1-1 assumption requires
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that g(0) = g(1). With this, note that
ΛGn+1(g(0)) = log
P1 {Gn+1 = g(0)}
P0 {Gn+1 = g(0)}
= log
∑
g′∈Gn
x∈{0,1}
βnw(g(x)|x,g
′)P1 {Xn = x,Gn = g
′}
∑
g′∈Gn
x∈{0,1}
βnw(g(x)|x,g
′)P0 {Xn = x,Gn = g
′}
(34)
= log
∑
x∈{0,1} P1 {Xn = x|Gn = g0}P1 {Gn = g0}∑
x∈{0,1} P0 {Xn = x|Gn = g0}P0 {Gn = g0}
(35)
=ΛGn−1(g0), (36)
Above, (34) is a consequence of g(0) = g(1), while (35) is because of the 1-1 condition
over the dynamic. Finally, to justify (36) let us first consider
Pw {Xn = x|Gn = g0} = λ(z0 + z1F
Λ
w (τn(g0)), x). (37)
Because τn(g0) /∈ [Ls, Us] then F
Λ
w (τn(g0)) is either 0 or 1; in any case it does not depends
on W . This, in turn means that P1 {Xn = x|Gn = g0} = P0 {Xn = x|Gn = g0}, which
explains how (36) is obtained.
Please note that (36) shows that, once τn leaves [Ls, Us], it keeps a constant value.
This, in turn, shows that weakly deterministic transitions satisfy the weakly consistency
condition.
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